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A B S T R A C T  
This article attempts to understand why ethnic-regional civil war has challenged 
the national unity of C6te dYIvoire and not Ghana, two neighbouring countries 
with nearly identical ethnic, religious and regional divisions, by examining politics 
at the grassroots. Based on a carefully controlled comparison of two similar re- 
gions of CBte dYIvoire and Ghana, the study investigates how participation in 
local voluntary associations reinforces the local experience of the state to shape 
the ongoing development of political values and affect the prospects for ethnic 
peace and democracy. The article finds that participation in ethnically hetero- 
geneous voluntary associations does not necessarily promote democratic values 
and practice. In fact, in Cbte d'Ivoire, participation in ethnically heterogeneous 
cocoa producer and mutual assistance organisations reinforces vertical patronage 
networks based on narrower ethnic identities. In contrast, in Ghana, participation 
in more ethnically homogeneous local church groups encourages the develop- 
ment of democratic values and practices at the local level that mediate the po- 
tential for ethnic conflict and support the consolidation of a democratic regime. 
While political instability and ethnic strife are hardly new in Africa, recent 
events in C6te d'Ivoire, a country that for decades has been heralded as a 
haven of political stability and economic growth on the continent, have 
startled and troubled many academics and policymakers. What  began as a 
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surprising series of coups d'tat in Abidjan in November 1999 grew into a 
protracted struggle between rival ethnic-regional factions for power, fi- 
nally exploding in September 2002 into a full-scale civil war that menaced 
the unity of the country. While a ceasefire was officially declared in May 
2003, the disarmament of an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 combatants has 
yet to begin, and ethnic clashes continue, particularly in what is now 
known as the 'Wild West'. 
Meanwhile, neighbouring Ghana, which is characterised by nearly 
identical ethnic, religious and regional splits and moved to a multiparty 
system during the same period,' has continued to consolidate its nascent 
democracy (Gyimah-Boadi 2001 ; Smith soor). In contrast to the rebellion 
and bloodshed in CBte d'Ivoire, the transfer of power to an opposition 
party in Ghana for the first time in nearly 20 years occurred with only a 
few isolated incidents of violence in the 2000 elections. While ethnic con- 
flict has flared recently in several regions of Ghana, to date the conflicts 
have been relatively localised and have not been motivated by ethnic or 
regional claims to national power as in CBte d'Ivoire.' 
What explains the differences in the ways that ethnic conflict erupts and 
plays out in the two countries? Why have similar ethnic cleavages become 
national battle lines in CBte d71voire, but only comparatively sporadic, 
local boundary disputes in Ghana? In order to understand how ethnic 
conflict may be mobilised or mediated in national politics, we must first 
examine how the potential for conflict is managed at the local level, the 
focus of this analysis. While much of the literature on ethnic conflict fo- 
cuses on international or national-level politics during a particular crisis 
period (Brown 2001; Deng & Zartman 1991; Lake & Rothchild 1998; 
Rothchild 1997; Stedman et al. 2002), this study examines everyday politics 
at the grassroots during 'normal' times. In particular, the article in- 
vestigates how participation in different types of local associations com- 
bines with contrasting legacies of state-society relations to shape different 
sets of political values and practices at the local level. Based on a carefully 
controlled comparison of two neighbouring regions of CBte d'Ivoire and 
Ghana, the findings demonstrate that participation in ethnically hetero- 
geneous associations does not necessarily promote cross-cutting social 
capital and cooperation in C8te d'Ivoire, as Varshney's (2002) work in 
India might suggest, but rather reinforces ethnically based vertical 
patronage networks between the village and capital. In contrast, partici- 
pation in ethnically homogeneous church groups encourages the devel- 
opment of democratic values and practices at the local level in Ghana. 
These differences in grassroots civil society and politics are not the on4 
factor explaining the outbreak of ethnic conflict in CBte dYIvoire and 
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relative peace in Ghana.3 Rather, this type of empirically grounded, local- 
level analysis is a necessary first step in understanding the dynamics of the 
broader national context. While there are unquestionably other important 
national and international causes precipitating violence in C6te d'Ivoire, 
this study seeks to illuminate how grassroots politics can either work for or 
against potential ethnic conflict. 
T H E  M I S S I N G  L I N K S  B E T W E E N  E T H N I C  CONFLICT,CIVIL SOCIETY, 
S O C I A L  C A P I T A L  A N D . , D E M O C R A T I C  C O N S O L I D A T I O N  
While the study of civil society, social capital and democracy are fre- 
quently connected and even made conceptually interde~endent,~ the 
literature on ethnic politics remains largely a separate and autonomous 
field of inquiry. In order to enhance our understanding of the process of 
democratic consolidation in ethnically divided societies in Africa and 
elsewhere (Ayee 2001; Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Diamond 1999; 
Gyirnah-Boadi 1999; Linz & Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1gg2,1gg4), we need 
to link insights from the ethnic politics literature to the civil society and 
social capital literatures. The work of Ashutosh Varshney (2002) is a 
noteworthy exception in its efforts to connect these disparate literatures. 
While sharing similar objectives, Varshney's conclusions differ in import- 
ant ways from this study. While also emphasising the preventive role of 
civic networks in mitigating communal violence, Varshney highlights the 
heterogeneity of associational membership in stimulating cross-cutting 
social ties across Hindu and Muslim communities. In contrast, this re- 
search reveals that a heterogeneous membership does not guarantee a 
growth in cross-group understanding or cooperation; instead, it is the 
parameters of participation encouraged within the association and corre- 
sponding community political institutions that matter most critically. 
Essentially, while Varshney emphasises the interaction of different ident- 
ities, this study problematises the nature of the interaction itself. 
First, the literature on ethnic politics is expanded by focusing on the 
grassroots level during periods of 'normal' politics. Much of this literature 
has either remained at the level of individual identity and psychology 
(Barth 1969; Geertz 1g73), or concentrated on the level of the nation to 
evaluate what factors (e.g. institutions, structures, and/or cultural histor- 
ies) exacerbate or mediate ethnic conflict (Rothchild 1997; Stedman et al. 
2002). Furthermore, much of the literature has focused on the resolution of 
ethnic conflict, selecting cases where ethnic strife has already become 
highly visible, politicised, and costly (Longman 1999; Stedman et al. 2002). 
Not enough attention has been devoted to non-crisis periods at the 
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community level to understand how local-level institutions may shape in- 
dividual values and identities, mediate conflict at the grassroots, and sup- 
port national cohesion, preventing widespread ethnic conflict in the first 
place.6 
Second, in addition to refocusing the analytic lens on ethnic politics, the 
article also contributes to the evolving literature on civil society by looking 
extensively within civil society organisations. Rather than assuming a 
connection between civil society and democracy (or between civil society 
and the perpetuation of societal inequality as the dissenters would argue), 
the internal structure and functioning of civil society organisations is 
critically examined to ask how participation in different types of organis- 
ation may influence the development of political values and practices at 
the local level.6 Supporting VonDoepp's (2002) analysis of local church 
groups in Malawi, the study finds that the inner politics of the organis- 
ations are more tightly connected to the actual opportunities for political 
participation and empowerment than may be anticipated by such general 
organisational descriptors as decentralised or hierarchical ~r~anisations.' 
Another key insight emerging from this cross-national comparison is 
that the organisation and experience of participating in civil society cannot 
be separated from the different legacies of state-society relations in a 
particular area. It is not only essential to examine how civil society is 
structured by the balance of societal power, as VonDoepp does so well 
with regard to gender inequalities, but also by the divergent experiences of 
the state. Contrasting histories of state-society relations in Cbte d'Ivoire 
and Ghana (Boone 1995,2003; Crook 1991; Crook & Manor 1998; FaurC 
1993; Nugent 1995; OWUSU 1970; Widner 1993; Woods 1994, 1999) shape 
the ways in which individuals even conceive of organising civil society at 
the local level. Then, experiences within civil society organisations often 
parallel and thus reinforce the initial variation in the ways that individuals 
interact with the state.8 Thus, differences in the organisation of civil society 
are not the on& reason political values and practices differ at the grassroots. 
However, this is an important factor which has not been adequately con- 
sidered, particularly in relation to the mediation of ethnic conflict. 
Third, several of the criticisms of the social capital literature are 
addressed. Much of this literature suggests that participation in local vol- 
untary associations fosters social capital that increases economic develop- 
ment (Fukuyama 1gg5), enhances good governance (Ostrom 1990; 
Putnam 1gg3), and bolsters the prospects for democracy (Putnam 1993). 
Not only is the development of social capital taken for granted, and es- 
sentially assumed to be 'positive',g the mechanisms between participation 
in local associations and actual governance or democratic practices are not 
P O L I T I C A L  V A L U E S  I N  C ~ T E  D ' I V O I R E  A N D  G H A N A  593 
always revealed. This article problematises the development of social 
capital by rigorously comparing how participation in different types of 
civil society organisations leads to different kinds of practices. 
The article also draws on the ethnic politics literature to highlight how 
the basis for membership within civil society organisations influences the 
development of political values and the likelihood of cooperation at the 
local level. Surprisingly, involvement in the cocoa producer or mutual 
assistance organisations in C6te d'Ivoire by a group that included mem- 
bers with quite diverse (and politically salient) ethnic, religious, and re- 
gional identities did not necessarily create social capital that cross-cut these 
cleavages. In fact, this more heterogeneous membership base probably 
hindered the expansion of participatory mechanisms and spurred recur- 
rent organisational crises. In contrast, the more homogeneous member- 
ship base of the Ghanaian church groups facilitated the inclusion of 
greater opportunities for participation, thus supporting the development 
of more democratic values and practices, albeit initially restricted within 
particular ethnic and religious groups. 
If the development of social capital was limited to the 'private ' sphere of 
voluntary associations and networks, as much of the existing literature 
tends to assume, then the end result for the mediation of ethnic conflict 
and prospects for peace in Cbte d'Ivoire and Ghana might be more similar 
than different. Social capital is not solely developed through participation 
in civil society organisations, however, but also in the spaces for interac- 
tion between individuals and the state. Historical processes of state for- 
mation play an important role in creating local d8erences.1° Thus, 
ironically, the social capital developed within ethnically and religiously 
homogeneous organisations such as the Ghanaian church groups is di- 
versified at the grassroots level due to the availability and legitimacy of 
political institutions for community decision-making. In contrast, despite 
the fact that membership in the producer cooperatives and mutual assist- 
ance groups is so heterogeneous in Cbte d'Ivoire, a lack of political par- 
ticipation within these organisations combines with a corresponding lack 
of vibrant community-level political institutions to discourage local cross- 
ethnic cooperation, and reinforce a more exclusive reliance on vertical, 
ethnically based patronage networks. 
The study is based on 18 months of intensive field research in 1998-99 
in two culturally and economically matched sub-regions on either side of a 
shared border in West Africa.'' After extensive interviews with national, 
regional and district officials and preliminary site visits, four villages were 
selected based on detailed criteria to ensure that they were representative 
of the region and country cases. In each region, sub-groups of the Akan 
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ethnic group predominate demographically, while various ethnic groups 
from the northern regions and Sahelian countries form substantial min- 
orities. This research design affords an opportunity to control many po- 
tential explanatory variables such as ethnic composition, levels of wealth, 
economic development, social infrastructure, and inheritance systems. 
The study combined quantitative and qualitative methods including a 
survey (n = 400), focus groups, in-depth interviews, ethnography, oral his- 
tories and archival research. 
D I F F E R E N C E S  I N  L O C A L  A S S O C I A T I O N A L  L I F E  I N  C ~ T E  D ' I V O I R E  
A N D  GHANA; I V O R I A N  P R O D U C E R  C O O P E R A T I V E S  A N D  
G H A N A I A N  C H U R C H E S  
Instead of assuming that civil society organisations either help or hurt the 
development of social capital and prospects for democratic peace, this 
study places the nature of association at the centre of investigation. Four 
aspects of local associations are compared: (I) the number, size and 
membership profiles of organisations in the villages; (2) the frequency of 
meetings and attendance; (3) the organisational structure and process of 
decision-making; and (4) the goals and effectiveness of the organisations. 
Significant differences exist between the few, large producer cooperatives 
and mutual assistance organisations found in Ivorian villages and the 
many, small churches active in Ghanaian villages. Later sections show 
how these associational differences are key to understanding the con- 
trasts in how village residents conceptualise politics and mediate ethnic 
tensions. 
Number, size and membershil, ofvolunta?y associations 
Signficant differences are found in the number, size and membership 
profle of voluntary associations in the villages under study. In the 
Ghanaian villages, there were more groups but they tended to be much 
smaller than in CGte d'Ivoire. The higher number of associations in 
Ghana was primarily due to the enormous growth and dynamism of 
churches throughout the country. Since the late 1g7os, Ghana has wit- 
nessed a tremendous proliferation of new charismatic and spiritual 
churches, as well as a revitalisation of the 'orthodox' or mainstream 
churches (Meyer 1995; Middleton 1983; Twumasi-Ankrah 1994). In each 
village in Ghana, there were five or more active churches and one 
mosque, each with its own youth group, women's organisation, choir, 
welfare association and/or prayer group. 
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While the membership profile of these organisations was relatively 
homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and, of course, religion (church 
organisations being dominated by local Akan Christians and mosques 
being dominated by Moslems who had migrated from either the northern 
regions of Ghana or SaheIian countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso), 
the class and gender composition was relatively heterogeneous. In both 
Ghanaian villages, religious associations included rich and poor, men and 
women. In fact, women made up perhaps 65% of church congregations 
and were generally very active in founding and organising church sub- 
groups. 
In addition to the predominant church groups, a variety of other 
voluntary associations existed in the Ghanaian villages, including an 
advocacy group for and by the elderly, two agricultural cooperatives, 
several informal savings cooperatives or 'susu' organisations, and a 
hometown association. Hence, the overwhelming majority of survey re- 
spondents in the Ghanaian villages belonged to at least one, and often 
several, local associations. However, cocoa farmers were almost totally 
unorganised in these villages, a difficult position given the recent liber- 
alisation of cocoa prices but reflective of current shifts in cash crop 
production away from cocoa toward food crops such as tomatoes and 
cassava (Morris MacLean 2004). While these types of voluntary associ- 
ation have received considerable attention for their dynamism in the 
literature on Ghana, they generally had even smaller memberships than 
the church groups and were less active than anticipated.'' For these 
reasons, this analysis focuses on the church groups, a more representa- 
tive, albeit ethnically homogeneous, type of association in these Ghanaian 
villages. 
In contrast, in CGte d'Ivoire, the few organisations that did exist had 
much larger and more ethnically heterogeneous membership bases than 
the many, small church groups in Ghana.13 The most notable voluntary 
association in each village was the cocoa and coffee producers' cooperat- 
ive (Groupement Voluntaire de Coophation or GVC). While GVCs were orig- 
inally government-inspired and directed, calling into question the initial 
'voluntary' nature of the associations, there had been considerable vol- 
untary regrouping and reorganising of the GVCs in each of the two 
Ivorian villages.14 Each GVC had 50-100 members, mostly men. In 
addition to being relatively homogeneous in terms of gender, the GVCs 
were also dominated by larger, wealthier farmers with shared economic 
interests. 
The other large voluntary association in each Ivorian village was the 
mutual assistance organisation, or mutuelle. These mutuelles are extremely 
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common in C6te d'lvoire, and are usually organised at the instigation of 
several village cadres in the urban centres, much like hometown associ- 
ations in Ghana. While each of them claimed to have all of the villagers as 
members, only a handful had paid the required membership dues. These 
members were primarily wealthier males with large plantations, civil ser- 
vice salaries or pensions, thus more homogeneous in class terms. Where the 
Ivorian organisations were notably more heterogeneous than the Ghanaian 
ones was in terms of their ethnic base. Both the GVCs and the mutual 
assistance organisations included significant numbers of members from 
the dominant Akan and minority non-Akan ethnicities found in the 
village. 
In further contrast to Ghana, churches were not the centre of associ- 
ational activity in CBte d'Ivoire. In the Ivorian villages, the Roman 
Catholic Church was dominant, with one mosque and one other church 
struggling to establish itself in each village. The Catholic Church usually 
had a choir, but any other groups within the church were very small or 
inactive. Again, women dominated the congregation, but there were fewer 
outlets for their active participation. 
Frequency of meetings and attendance 
The few, large organisations found in CBte d'Ivoire met much less fre- 
quently or regularly than the many, smaller associations in Ghana. The 
survey data confirms a statistical significance (= 0.003) in the lower mean 
frequency of attendance in local voluntary organisations in CBte d'Ivoire 
than in Ghana. 
In CBte d'Ivoire, the mutual assistance organisations usually met as a 
group only annually. The officers of the group, whose decisions were 
communicated informally or formally at the annual assembly, conducted 
all other meetings. The GVC met only slightly more frequently as a g ro~~p ,  
usually twice a year, once before the long harvest and once at the end. 
Even the Catholic Church choir met only twice a month at most. 
In contrast, in Ghana it was common for members of each church 
congregation to gather daily for prayer at 5 a.m., by the dim light of a 
kerosene lantern, before the sun came up and it was time to go to farm. In 
addition to these daily devotions, each of the Ghanaian church sub-groups 
met weekly. Since most church members belonged to more than one sub- 
group, they might meet with other congregation members as frequently as 
twice daily. While the church groups were visibly (and audibly) the most 
active in the village, the other voluntary associations also met more regu- 
larly than any groups in the Ivorian villages. 
Organirational structure and process o f  decision-making 
Third, the organisational structure and decision-making process of the 
associations also differed between CBte d'Ivoire and Ghana. In C6te 
d'Ivoire, most of them were more self-consciously hierarchical, and oper- 
ated in a top-down fashion. Often, although the top officer was popularly 
elected, all of the other positions were appointed, much as the Ivorian 
president appoints his cabinet. In some organisations, even the top officer 
was not elected, but rather chosen by consensus. Ethnographic obser- 
vation of meetings revealed that the decision-making tended to be 
dominated by consensus among existing powerbrokers in the Ivorian 
organisations, and by voting in the Ghanaian ones. Frequently, members 
of the leadership explained that this technique was preferable to a demo- 
cratic vote, as elections caused unwanted divisions and factions in the 
village. Interestingly, this response echoed a familiar refrain heard in the 
late 1980s from the previous single-party leadership justifying resistance to 
multipartyism in CBte d'lvoire. 
In CBte d'Ivoire, officers frequently took all significant decisions in iso- 
lation from the larger group of members who had fewer opportunities to 
participate in decision-making. For instance, the semi-annual meetings of 
the GVC usually only pronounced the procedures for the coming harvest 
or gave an accounting at the end of the harvest. Although a slightly higher 
percentage of survey respondents in CBte d'Ivoire (16%) reported that 
they participated in the leadership of a local voluntary organisation than 
in Ghana (qO/o), this slight disparity was not statistically significant (sig- 
nificance =o.511). This difference probably reflects the more vertical and 
hierarchical organisational structure of most Ivorian organisations, where 
each officer had a deputy. 
In Ghana, the structure of most associations was less hierarchical and 
more participatory than in CBte d'Ivoire. There were commonly officers, 
such as a president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer, but these po- 
sitions were usually elected by a general vote of the entire membership. 
Often the vote included at least some element of discretion or secrecy, for 
example, the candidates were asked to leave the room during a show of 
hands. The study found that both men and women from a range of class 
backgrounds were elected to leadership positions. In addition to the elec- 
tion of the leadership in the Ghanaian villages, many decisions were vetted 
and then brought to a general vote before proceeding. Members fre- 
quently justified these practices as an attempt to incorporate the 'new 
system of democracy' in their organisations. Here again, the study reveals 
how the rhetoric and experience of the larger political system shapes how 
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villagers conceive of organising civil society organisations in contrasting 
ways in Cbte d'Ivoire and Ghana. 
Goals and effectiveness of voluntaly associations 
In general, the goals of the Ivorian voluntary associations were broader 
and more ambitious than those of the Ghanaian ones, often focusing on 
projects for the entire community rather than primarily on their members' 
needs. The GVCs and mutual assistance groups in Cbte dYIvoire were 
founded not only to provide assistance in times of need for the contribu- 
ting members, but also to fund major infrastructure projects for the village. 
One mutuelle had constructed several classrooms for the school; another 
had built the school canteen. 
In comparison, while the Ghanaian organisations rarely attempted to 
finance community development, their activities often included a strong 
element of self-sacrifice for the particular group of members. For example, 
several churches had welfare funds, where members either gave a monthly 
donation or worked periodically on a communal farm and contributed the 
proceeds to the fund. Also, any time a church member was in need, a 
special offering would be collected at the church, and the congregation 
would organise to provide frequent visits and social support. 
While many of the Ivorian voluntary associations had quite impressive 
goals and positive intentions, they were, unfortunately, less effective than 
the Ghanaian groups. Often the broader objectives of the Ivorian as- 
sociations required a sizable financial base and thus a more burdensome 
financial participation by the members. Frequently, many GVC members 
were unable to contribute due to economic hardship, and thus only a 
minority, or even one lone cadre, provided the necessary financial re- 
sources. This often led to a precarious position as the continuation of the 
organisation's activities depended on one person's volition and oversight. 
At other times, GVC members chose not to pay their annual dues, as they 
deemed the leadership untrustworthy. 
With more ambitious goals came a larger treasury, which required both 
more advanced accounting skills and the mechanisms necessary to prevent 
embezzlement. In one village, widespread mistrust of accounting practices 
stimulated the break-up of the 'village GVC' into three smaller, separate 
GVCs. Agricultural extension agents repeatedly encouraged village 
leaders to reconcile and reunite into one larger and more effective group, 
but all attempts to date have been unsuccessful. Similarly, in 1999, one 
mutuelle skipped its annual meeting, due to a lack of financial participation 
and cohesion. Ivorian leaders frequently recounted long histories of the 
repeated creation and dissolution of previous organisations with similar 
goals. 
In comparison, partially because the group objectives were more lim- 
ited in Ghana, the required financial contributions were not as burden- 
some; thus most members were able and d i n g  to participate. The survey 
data confirmed that the mean financial contribution of Ghanaians was 
slightly lower than for Ivorians. Furthermore, the Ghanaian organisations 
generally lasted longer and experienced fewer factions or breakdowns 
than their Ivorian counterparts. 
E F F E C T S  O F  D I V E R G E N T  A S S O C I A T I O N A L  L I F E  O N  S U P P O R T I N G  
D E M O C R A T I C  V A L U E S  A T  T H E  G R A S S R O O T S  
The above differences in the organisation of local voluntary associations 
result in different types of local political values and practices, with irn- 
portant implications for the mediation of potential ethnic conflict at the 
grassroots, and for the prospects of democracy at the local and national 
levels. Ironically, the more ethnically heterogeneous associations in Cbte 
d'Ivoire hindered genuine political participation and democratic decision- 
making, strengthening traditional hierarchies and hardening social and 
political exclusion along ethnic lines. In contrast, participation in more 
ethnically homogeneous church groups in Ghana offered more frequent 
and genuine opportunities for individuals to 'practice democracy', there- 
by providing enhanced support for the development of democratic values, 
and ultimately, greater capacity and interest in cross-ethnic cooperation 
for local problem-solving. Thus, it is not the association itself that is acting 
to mediate ethnic tensions at the grassroots, but rather, how individual 
association members gain new sets of political skills and values that they 
then bring to other political contexts. While this article highlights the or- 
ganisation of civil society, it is not the only factor shaping political values. 
Divergent experiences of the state at the local level both interact with the 
organisation of civil society, and exert an independent effect on the 
development of local political values and practices.15 
A key issue that troubles many studies dealing with democracy is how to 
define and measure the concept.16 Democracy will be defined here 
broadly as a political system where the members participate in the de- 
cision-making of their community. In order to ascertain the extent of 
democratic values and practice in Ghana and CGte d'Ivoire, three areas 
will be compared below: (I) the conceptualisation of the state-society re- 
lationship, including the rights and obligations associated with citizenship; 
(2) the salience and organisation of local politics; and (3) the mechanisms 
for making claims from the local to the national level. 
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Conctpualisation ofthe state-sociep relationship 
First, the experience of interacting in different types of local associations is 
an important factor in shaping the divergent ways that Ivorians and 
Ghanaians conceptualise the state-society relationship and the parameters 
of citizenship, both locally and nationally. Generally, Ivorians tended to 
view the state in more personalised terms, as an organisation that should 
deliver an expansive list of entitlements to citizens with very minimal ac- 
knowledgement of reciprocal duties. In contrast, Ghanaians perceived the 
state in terms of a civil administration that should provide certain public 
goods and services in exchange for community-organised efforts to de- 
velop the country. This more community-oriented notion of citizenship in 
Ghana than in C6te d'Ivoire facilitates the resolution of any ethnic ten- 
sions at the village rather than the national level. 
Conceptualisation of the state 
When describing the state, Ivorians and Ghanaians mentioned different 
units or levels of administration or authority. Ivorians defined 'state' al- 
most immediately in terms of individual political authorities, not the civil 
administration. Only one person mentioned civil servants as the state; 
everyone else interviewed mentioned politically elected or appointed offi- 
cials such as the mayor, prtfet, ministers, president, etc., frequently re- 
ferring to individual politicians by name, rather than by their offices. In 
contrast, Ghanaians repeatedly used the word 'government' in their de- 
scriptions, seemingly referring to the civil administration or bureaucracy 
as a whole." 
Ivorians and Ghanaians also differed in their descriptions of the re- 
lationship between the state and local people. While both Ivorian and 
Ghanaian respondents described a paternalistic state, in CBte d'Ivoire a 
more straightforward, top-down paternalism of the state as 'guardian' 
seemed to reinforce the perception of unequal levels of power between the 
state and local people. One village resident highlighted the tension be- 
tween the commonly espoused ideal of the 'state as all of us' and the 
reality of an abysmal lack of connection between the state and the vil- 
lagers :I8 
The state is all of us. But, our elected officials do not come to the source for their 
information, let's say, regarding our key problems . . . M. Brou Emile, President of 
the National Assembly, doesn't even know here in Opanin. He takes decisions all 
by himself, and we don't like that. Otherwise, the state is all of us. 
This lack of connection between elite decision-makers and masses 
seemed to be paralleled in everyday village politics in CBte d'Ivoire, 
particularly when it came to non-indigenous populations. For example, 
when 'thieves' from outside the village attempted to burgle a non- 
indigenous cocoa farmer, the exclusively indigenous elders gathered 
together in a closed meeting to discuss the problem and create a village 
security patrol. Based on participant accounts, there was little or no non- 
indigenous input into the village effort to protect itself, despite the fact that 
the actual incident provoking the meeting involved a non-Akan family, 
and, further, that the most 'vulnerable' residents living on the village's 
edges were non-Akan. 
- 
In comparison, Ghanaians. frequently articulated their notion of pa- 
ternalism within a familial idiom of reciprocal duties between the 'father' 
and his children. 'The elders or big people should do their part for us; the 
children, too, to do our part. 'lg This familial idiom seemed to be extended 
at the village level to include non-indigenous chieftancies and village resi- 
dents. Even at funerals for Akan residents in the Ghanaian villages, non- 
indigenous residents were included in the planning and financing of the 
event, and non-indigenous chiefs were given places of honour, albeit (of 
course) subordinate to the Akan village chief. In contrast, in CBte d'Ivoire, 
the non-indigenous chieftancies were not as integrally incorporated in 
funeral planning, and then, when their 'voluntary' contribution was 
judged inadequate, Akan residents complained of their insulting lack of 
respect for the Akan system of governance. 
Local notions ofthe lights ofcitizenship in Ghana and C6te d'lvoire 
Consistent with the finding that Ivorians and Ghanaians conceive of the 
state in different terms, the research suggests that they have developed 
varying notions of the rights and duties of citizenship.20 Again, the diver- 
gent local practices associated with local voluntary associations are not the 
only factors in shaping local conceptualisations of citizenship; neverthe- 
less, since the comparison of these regions controls for so many variables, 
the finding of a relationship is a useful starting point for further research in 
this area.21 
Perceptions of the rights of citizenship differ in two important ways in 
these regions of C8te d'Ivoire and Ghana (see Table I). First, Ivorians were 
apt to have a much more expansive view of the state's role in their lives, 
often presenting a long list of entitlements owed to them from an om- 
niscient and omnipotent state. For example, one 40-year-old Ivorian man 
ticked off several things that the state should give him and then sum- 
marised by saying that the state should provide 'everything I need'.22 In 
contrast, Ghanaians tended to respond with a relatively restricted list .of 
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Comparison of perceptions of citizens' rights in Ghana 
and C6te d'Ivoire 
CBte d'Ivoire Ghana 
Perception of rights Expansive list of entitlements Restricted list of rights linked 
explicitly to duties 
Nature of goods Private goods consumed by 
delivered by state individuals 
Three most frequently Individual loans (28 %) 
mentioned rights Cash grants to needy (10 %) 
Housing (16 %) 
Employment (16 %) 
Extremely low scores Provision of physical security (2 %) 
on 'classic' Protection of private property (0 %) 
citizenship rights Protection of equality (04 %) 
associated with Guarantee of freedom (2 %) 
Western democracies Freedom to participate in 
political processes (0.4 %) 
Public goods consumed by 
comn~unities 
Social services (33 %) 
Employment (24 %) 
Roads/markets/electricity (21 %) 
Provision of physical security (I %) 
Protection of private property (1.5 %) 
Protection of equality ( r  %) 
Guarantee of freedom (0.6 %) 
Freedom to participate in political 
processes (o %) 
rights that were frequently linked in the same sentence to corresponding 
duties. For example, one survey respondent replied, ' I  would do anything 
I am asked to do, be it payment of money (taxes), etc., if only that will help 
to improve education. '23 This finding strengthens the earlier evidence of a 
more explicit view of reciprocity between the state and citizens in Ghana 
than in C6te d'Ivoire. 
Second, the nature of the rights owed to citizens differed in C8te 
d'Ivoire and in Ghana. In contrast to the largely community orientation of 
the rights described by Ghanaians, every one of the rights most frequently 
mentioned by Ivorians related to private goods consumed by individuals. 
For example, the most frequently cited right in C6te d'Ivoire was that the 
state should provide loans to individuals (28 %) for individual farm ex- 
pansion or enterprises. Consistent with the earlier point about more ex- 
pansive entitlements, almost as many Ivorians (20 %) asserted that the state 
should 'give me some money' as outright cash grants instead of credit. In 
addition to housing (16 %) and employment (16%), Ivorians frequently 
included food and even various individual consumer goods as something 
the state should give to citizens for free. For example, one Ivorian declared 
in all seriousness, 'The state should buy me a car, purchase me a re- 
frigerator, and build a house for me.'24 
Meanwhile, it seems that Ghanaians conceptualised their rights as citi- 
zens in terms of public goods that the state provides to communities, such 
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of duties of citizens in Ghana and C8te d'Ivoire 
C6te d'Ivoire Ghana 
Perceptio~~ of duties Concept of obligations more Explicit notion of 
difficult to grasp reciprocity 
Nature of duties owed to Performed as an individual Performed together as a 
the state community and/or to 
benefit the community 
Three most frequently Work on individual farm (58 %) Develop the community/ 
mentioned duties Participate in politics (10 %) country (47 %) 
Develop community/ Pay taxes (22 %) 
country (10 %) Perform communal labor (21 %) 
Extremely low scores on Pay taxes (8 %) Participate in politics (7 %) 
'classic' citizenship duties Obey laws (7 %) Obey laws (3 %) 
associatedwith Western Selve the military (o %) Serve the milita~y (o %) 
democracy 
as social services or the construction of roads. An aalysis of the three most 
frequently cited rights by survey respondents in Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire 
illustrates the above pattern vividly. In Ghana, one third of the survey 
respondents (33 %) said that citizens had a right to the provision of social 
services, often free or low-cost education or health care.25 Only 10% of 
respondents replied similarly in C6te d'Ivoire. This Ivorian sense of indi- 
vidual entitlement served to reinforce the ethnically based patronage sys- 
tem rather than foster a multiethnic .conception of community as in 
Ghana. 
A cornpanson ofthe duties of citizenship in Ghana and C$te d'Iuoire 
Ivorians and Ghanaians tend to think about the duties of citizenship in 
distinct ways that parallel the patterns found above (See Table 2). First, 
while Ivorians tended to dwell on entitlements and then struggle longer 
with the concept of duties, Ghanaians linked rights and duties explicitly in 
descriptions of reciprocity with the state. As one Ivorian exclaimed, 'It's us 
that don't have anything. Who should help the state, and why?!'26 
Second, the nature of the duties owed to the state continued to be more 
individually oriented in C6te d'Ivoire and community oriented in Ghana. 
The most frequently cited reply in C8te d'Ivoire was 'to work on the 
respondent's individual farm' (58 %), whereas the most frequently cited 
response in Ghana was 'to work to develop the community or country as a 
whole' (52 %). As one Ivorian explained, 'Eveiy morning, I go to the farm. 
This is all that I can do for the state.'27 Almost all of the Ivorian 
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respondents spoke in terms of how the state benefited from their individual 
cash crop production, but almost never in terms of how their individual food 
crop production increased the food security of the nation as a whole, as so 
many Ghanaians did. 
Another indicator of a more community oriented conceptualisation of 
duties in Ghana is that over three times as many Ghanaian respondents 
(22 O/O) mentioned the obligation to pay taxes as Ivorians (7 9'0). Ghanaians 
not only mentioned taxation more frequently, but almost always put it in 
the context of reciprocity for state-provided services. For example, several 
Ghanaians asserted that citizens should pay taxes in return for the state's 
efforts to create jobs, provide free medical care and free education. In 
contrast, while several Ivorians indirectly referred to state taxation of their 
cash crop production, very few directly discussed paying taxes to the state 
as an obligation. They only spoke of payment to the state in highly per- 
sonalised and ceremonial terms to acknowledge state representatives visi- 
ting the village, for example, giving a sheep to honour a visiting politician. 
In general, the comments by Ivorian respondents illuminated a popular 
sense of submission uis-2-uis a dominant state, and lacked any notion of 
representation or reciprocity. 
Lastly, the contrasting perceptions of communal labour in CBte d'Ivoire 
and Ghana revealed dramatically the nature of citizenship in the two 
cases. In C8te d'Ivoire, fewer than I Oh of all respondents mentioned 
communal labour, whereas in Ghana communal labour was noted ex- 
plicitly by almost 21 % of respondents. In CBte d'Ivoire, communal labour 
seemed to be viewed negatively, as an indicator of state failure. When one 
Ivorian respondent described how the 'cadres' had organised the village 
to construct several school classrooms, he was openly resentful of the vil- 
lage's forced assumption of what he viewed clearly as a state responsi- 
bility.28 
In comparison, one long-time resident of Makwan, Ghana, explained 
the commonlv shared view that a deffree of local participation and self- 
reliance was necessary and positive: 'The citizens are too many for the 
state to be able to help, so the citizen should rather do something to 
improve their lot instead of relying on the state.'" During the time of 
fieldwork in both Ghanaian villages, the chief or local unit committee (a 
group of popularly elected village residents who manage village problems 
and represent the village at the district level) frequently organised work 
groups to facilitate a government-sponsored electrification project, pro- 
vide labour for the construction of a school building, or make preparations 
for a funeral. Usually, the gong-gong beater would announce ahead of 
time that residents from a particular side of the road would work one day, 
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and from the other side, the next. Opinion in both Ghanaian villages was 
that participation in communal labour was high, enforceable, and evenly 
distributed among residents. In particular, no one in Ghana ever claimed 
that a greater burden of communal labour was imposed on certain eth- 
nic groups. In contrast, in C8te d'Ivoire, several chiefs representing mi- 
grant ethnic groups complained that the village chief only consulted them 
when some onerous task needed to be accomplished for the rest of the 
village. 
To summarise, the political structure and practice of ethnically homo- 
geneous church groups in Ghana strengthened the development of more 
democratic values than in CBte d'Ivoire in terms of greater political par- 
ticipation by a larger number of individuals in the decision-making of the 
community. Even though Ghanaian church group members might not 
interact with individuals from other ethnic groups within their church 
activities, they spoke of their expanded appreciation of 'democracy' and 
'participation', and expressed a greater toleration of differences of 
opinion. The values forged through their associational participation then 
influenced the ways that everyday issues were approached in the village 
chieftaincy or unit committee. Thus, in Ghana, the various non-indigen- 
ous ethnic groups were routinely included in the planning for village 
events, whereas in CBte d'Ivoire, conflict was sparked over how the non- 
indigenous groups were participating (or not). 
Dtjierences in the salience and organisation of local politics in Ghana and 
Cite d'lvoire: irreleuance in Cite d'Iuoire versus growing importance in Ghana 
The divergent structure of voluntary associations shapes how local politi- 
cal institutions are viewed and evaluated by village residents in CBte 
d'Ivoire and Ghana, with important implications for how they mediated 
ethnic tensions on an everyday basis. Generally, the more active church 
groups in Ghana reinforced more frequent social interaction between 
members of different extended families, classes and genders in the same 
- 
village community, which made local politics, including political party 
organisation, more active, salient, and openly heterogeneous. In contrast, 
the less active associations in CBte d'Ivoire strengthened ties between 
members of the same nuclear and extended family or members of the 
same class. These vertical ties also extended more frequently outside the 
village community, more tightly linking urban cadres with village resi- 
dents, making local politics less salient, and fostering a more top-down 
organisation of state institutions and political parties in CBte d'Ivoire than 
in Ghana. 
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Again, this article does not dismiss how divergent histories with local 
and national state institutions directly influence villagers' evaluation of 
local institutions' relevance. Instead, it seeks to highlight how experiences 
in local associations can parallel and reinforce these legacies, resulting in 
even sharper distinctions between CSte d'Ivoire and Ghana, a dynamic 
that is often missed and even more rarely brought to bear on the issue of 
mediating potential ethnic conflict at the grassroots. 
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Salience of local state political institutions in Ghana and Cite d'lvoire 
Evidence from the survey research suggests that Ghanaians placed more 
value on local political institutions than did Ivorians. In general, 
Ghanaians noted representatives of the most local-level state and 'tra- 
ditional' political institutions as the most important leaders for village de- 1 
velopment, whereas Ivoirians mentioned individuals who were not 
necessarily locally based. In Ghana, the unit committee (82 %), the village 
chief (55%), and the District Assembly (24O/0) were cited the most fre- 
quently as the most important leaders for development. In contrast, 
demonstrating a lack of confidence in local-level political institutions, 
Ivorians mentioned the chief much less frequently (25%), and rarely 
mentioned the most local political authority, the sous-prtfet (4%) or 
mayor (~O/O).'~ Instead, most Ivorians (51 %) cited, often by name, wealthy 
civil servants ('cadres') as being the most influential person or group for 
genital shrinking, the potential for escalation was stymied by the village 
chiefs insistence that the matter be resolved immediately by him, his 
elders, and the concerned parties in his 'traditional court' in the village, not 
taken to the district capital. The effort to bring everyone together quickly 
and publicly in a calm atmosphere served to rapidly infuse the rumours 
circulating throughout the village with more accurate information, and to 
provide a mechanism for village-wide reconciliation. In comparison, in 
C6te d'Ivoire, when the local GVC was irnmobilised by accusations of 
embezzlement, levelled primarily in ethnic terms at the non-indigenous 
treasurer, the village chief quickly passed the problem up to the regional 
government for their intervention. The result was interminable delays, a 
lack of public information, and hence the rumours and ethnic tensions 
continued to swell. 
the development of their community. The second most frequently ident- 
ified leaders of village development were simply 'the rich' (16 %), or large 
cocoa farmers (11 %), neither of which were ever cited in Ghana. The 
comparison of this frequency of responses demonstrates dramatically the 
confluence of economic and political power that is rooted in personal 
wealth and achievement in C6te dYIvoire, rather than any elected or ap- 
pointed local office, as is the case in Ghana. Because the above political 
and economic exclusion in CGte d'Ivoire reinforces major ethnic, religious 
and regional divisions in the country, and since local political institutions 
are either absent or irrelevant, conflicts over power and resources tend to 
become national crises framed in terms of a zero-sum game between 
various ethno-regional groups. 
Examples from each country demonstrate how the different value 
placed on local institutions either helped or hindered the resolution of 
ethnic tensions in the village. First, an incident during the period of my 
fieldwork in Barima, Ghana, reveals how a more powerful role for the 
chief helped to resolve an ethnic conflict before it became violent. When a 
my non-indigenous research assistant was accused by a village resident of 
.A. 
Local-level political party organisation 
Although respondents in both CGte d'Ivoire and Ghana hardly ever 
mentioned political party officials as key leaders of village development, 
the different ways in which political parties are organised at the local level 
are influenced by the differences in the organisation of local  association^.^^ 
Paralleling the patterns seen earlier with local associations, political party 
meetings and activity seemed to be much less frequent and in- 
stitutionalised at the village level in CGte d'Ivoire. Representatives of the 
ruling party acknowledged that they only met regularly immediately prior 
to elections. Even then, the party appeared to focus on organising small 
festivals and rallies to receive visiting party bosses from Abidjan. These 
visits also appeared to be largely initiated by the regional and national 
party officials, not the village representatives. The opposition parties were 
beginning to get organised for the 2000 elections, but much less energeti- 
cally than in Ghana. The Rally for a Democratic Republic (RDR) ap- 
peared to be quietly establishing initial village cells, but there was no 
official representative (as for the then-ruling PDCI), and there were no 
regular meetings. Opposition activity was also conducted in a tenser at- 
mosphere of greater secrecy in C6te d'Ivoire than in Ghana. Opposition 
party representatives claimed that there were actually more party mem- 
bers in the village, but that local people were fearful of declaring openly 
their opposition to the long-dominant PDCI.32 Without much evidence 
from political activity in the public realm, many village residents simply 
ascribed particular party loyalties to their neighbours, wholly based on 
their ethnicity or place of origin?' Given the uneasy political atmosphere, 
these assumptions only served to increase tensions and divisions between 
the different ethnic communities. 
$.  
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In comparison, the Ghanaian villagers were more actively and con- 
tinuously involved in local political party organisations than their Ivorian 
counterparts. During the time of the field research in 1998-99, the oppo- 
sition party representatives (in particular, the New Patriotic Party or NPP) 
appeared to be the most active, organising informal weekly meetings over 
a year and a half in advance of the 2000 elections (which the NPP won). 
These meetings included some limited discussion of programmatic issues, 
but focused largely on local party strategy to win voters, increase voter 
participation, and eliminate electoral manipulation and fraud. Local party 
leaders also tried to institutionalise the party organisation at the village 
level by opening up party offices in each village. The district offices ac- 
tively supported these developments by organising events to inaugurate 
the new headquarters of the party's village cell. Ironically, the then-ruling 
party (the National Democratic Congress or NDC) seemed less active with 
regard to village-level organising. Party representatives in the village de- 
scribed extensive factionalisation within the district branch of the ruling 
party, paralleling divisions at the national level and hindering organis- 
ation. It is important to note, however, that none of these divisions within 
the local NDC or the other opposition parties were organised along 
ethnic lines. Any ethno-regional bases for the Ghanaian national parties, 
arguably weaker to begin with in Ghana than in C8te d'Ivoire during 
this period, were further blurred at the village level where the relevant 
ethnicities were not proportionally represented as in the national popu- 
lation. 
To  summarise this subsection, in CBte d'Ivoire, since producer co- 
operatives and mutual assistance groups rarely met, and when they did 
assemble, participation was more limited, there were fewer opportunities 
for social interaction across different categories of ethnicity or class, de- 
spite their more ethnically heterogeneous membership base. The more 
vertical and hierarchical nature of associations reinforced the social and 
political exclusion of poor families versus rich ones, inducing a narrower 
type of social trust that was less likely to lead to coalition building across 
the community. Since chieftaincy institutions are relatively weak, no 
elected political institution exists in Ivorian villages, and local political 
party organisation is minimal, individuals had little incentive or capacity 
from any realm to solve problems at the community Frequently, 
individuals and groups proceeded directly to their personal contacts (al- 
most exclusively within their own ethnic group) positioned in the higher 
echelons of the political system. 
In contrast, in Ghana, since local church groups met more frequently, 
greater opportunities for social interaction existed at the local level. While 
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the basis of these ties was relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic, re- 
ligious and/or regional identity, the social linkages across categories of 
gender and class provided greater opportunities to gain knowledge and 
develop confidence of individuals who belonged to groups outside one's 
extended family than those organisations in C6te d'Ivoire, which super- 
ficially appeared more heterogeneous. Furthermore, the more participa- 
tory nature of these voluntary organisations provided individuals with little 
prior political and/or economic status with new and more frequent op- 
portunities to voice their opinions and exercise leadership. This more ac- 
tive and heterogeneous local social and political experience in church 
groups combined with the availability of viable local political institutions 
such as the chieftaincy and unit committee, to encourage a greater will- 
ingness and capacity to come together to resolve community problems at 
the local level, rather than skipping to higher levels in the political system. 
The unit committee, in particular, included a diversity of elected mem- 
bers, including men, women, youth, and non-indigenous ethnic groups. 
Local political institutions and local capacity for conflict resolution is thus 
stronger in Ghana than in C8te d'Ivoire, a key reason why the potential 
for ethnic conflict has remained more localised in Ghana, and has not 
erupted into a national crisis as in CGte dYIvoire. 
Practice ofpolitics at the national level: linking the local upward in Ghana 
and C6te d'lvoire 
The character of local associations in Ghana and C8te d'Ivoire not only 
shapes how people view the relevance of local political institutions in dif- 
ferent ways, but also how they organise politics at the national level. 
Rather than relying on problematic statistics of voter this 
study compares village organisation and everyday political practice which 
link the local to the national level. While existing scholarship highlights the 
important role of clientelist networks for the state in Africa (Bayart 1993; 
Hyden 1983), rarely is the character of local associations connected ex- 
plicitly to the nature of the broader patron-client system at the national 
level. In C8te d'Ivoire, the greater dependence on cadres based in the 
national capital for leadership, accountability, and financing strengthened 
a more nationalised patron-client system. Meanwhile, in Ghana, the more 
village-centred leadership, governance, and funding of associations re- 
inforced a more localised patronage system. Thus, social ties linked village 
residents more frequently and directly to the national capital in C8te 
d'Ivoire than in Ghana, where clientelist ties tended to be denser within 
the village or at most within the district. 
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Thus, in C6te d'Ivoire, the channels for making political demands were 
relatively narrower, more vertical, and ethnically homogeneous; village 
residents depended on one or two cadres from their own extended family, 
and thus their own ethnic group, and contacted them directly in Abidjan 
when something was needed. One Ivorian woman declared succinctly, 'If 
you have problems, those who work in Abidjan can help resolve the 
problem. '36 This is not unusual given the lack of locally available political 
institutions discussed earlier. Despite comparable travel times to the re- 
gional and national capitals as in Ghana, the clientelist networks in the 
Ivorian village usually skipped the closest levels of the political system in 
order to appeal directly to the top via one personal contact. 'The 
government doesn't intervene here (in the village). It's necessary to have a 
person on high over there in order to have ~omething.'~' Still, simply 
because these clientelist networks were more personalised in C6te d'Ivoire, 
does not mean that they are necessarily more open, inclusionary, or flex- 
ible. In CBte d'Ivoire, social connections clearly overlap with economic 
and political power from the local all the way up to the national level. The 
patrons one could contact were almost always within one's own extended 
family (and ethnic group), and contrary to most assumptions in the 
literature, often whole extended families were relatively rich or poor. 'We, 
the poor, who don't have anyone in Abidjan, get less help and those who 
have contacts, and above all, those who have money get more help.'38 
Many Ivorian respondents lamented that because they were 'unknown' 
by political officials, they were 'powerless' to make any claims or express 
their interests in any way, an experience described by one young man as 
being 'blind and deaf'.39 
In contrast, clientelist networks appear to be more localised in Ghana. 
Strengthening the localisation of clientelist networks at the national level 
in Ghana are two factors: (I) the history of fear and intimidation of state 
authority, particularly during the early years of Rawlings' rule; and (2) the 
lack of linkages that 'scale up' from the local to the national level4' 
Revealing both factors, one Ghanaian woman commented, 'If we could 
take these issues up there (Accra), we would have gone.'41 Instead of 
skipping to the national level, villagers frequently took their problems to 
the Unit C~mmittee.~'  
If a problem persisted or a higher level of intervention was necessary, 
often villagers travelled to the district assembly to meet district officials. 
Sometimes the villagers went to the district capital with a Unit Committee 
member or the elected District Assemblyman from their village, but often 
they represented themselves at these meetings. It is impossible to know 
what proportion of these meetings could be characterised as clientelistic 
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without being able to observe them. Still, it is observable that villagers (or 
clients) visited local political officials (their patrons) on the two levels of the 
political system closest to them. It seemed relatively rare for village resi- 
dents to be willing and able to make the trip to either the regional (I  hour 
travel time) or national capital (5 hours travel time). And, even rarer, that 
someone else was able to facilitate that contact to a higher order political 
official. 
T o  summarise, this section illustrates a remarkable divergence in the 
local values and practices of democracy in similar villages in C8te dYIvoire 
and Ghana. The differences .between the two cases in the conceptualisa- 
tion of the state-society relationship, the salience and organisation of local 
politics, and the mechanisms for making claims on the national political 
system reveal a consistent pattern where political participation and de- 
cision-making is relatively inactive and exclusive at the local level in C6te 
d'Ivoire compared with Ghana. The organisation of local associational life 
is an important factor in shaping (and often reinforcing) the development 
of contrasting local political values. These findings have important im- 
plications for the mediation of ethnic conflict both at the grassroots and at 
the national level. 
T o  conclude, differences in the organisation and practices of local as- 
sociations in similar villages in similar regions of C6te d'Ivoire and Ghana 
have combined with different experiences of the state to produce divergent 
sets of political values and practices in the larger political system. Thus, 
there are important distinctions to be made about the character of grassroots 
associations, particularly with regard to their effects on 'making democ- 
racy work'. In C6te dYIvoire, despite the promise of a more heterogeneous 
membership base, the structure of associations restricted popular partici- 
pation over decision-making, and, perhaps, stunted the development of 
democratic values and practices at the local level. Instead, the significant 
financial contributions of a few individuals usually translated into sub- 
stantial political power in local organisations, which weakened account- 
ability and transparency. Thus, despite the greater ethnic, religious and 
regional heterogeneity of the membership of Ivorian organisations, their 
limited activity and opportunity for social interaction combined with the 
greater rate of organisational failure to undermine trust of other groups 
instead of increase it. Furthermore, few viable political institutions existed 
at the village level in C6te d'Ivoire to counter this lack of political par- 
ticipation in local decision-making. Consequently, Ivorians tend to be less 
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connected to their community in their everyday interactions, and the focus 
of politics shifts to their individual abilities to access powerful patrons 
within their own ethnic group, particularly within their own extended 
family system. This ethnically based patronage system not only reinforces 
the economic and political salience of ethnic identity today, but crowds 
out the possibility of building multiethnic mechanisms of conflict resol- 
ution in the future. 
In contrast, in Ghana, many more individuals participated almost daily 
in the decision-making of local church groups. While these church groups 
were relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic, regional and obviously 
religious identities, there were genuine opportunities for social interaction 
and decision-making between men and women belonging to different 
classes and extended family systems. While the social capital developed 
within the Ghanaian organisations did not cut across all social cleavages in 
the village community, it was nevertheless an important resource, pro- 
viding Ghanaian villagers with the confidence, skills and willingness to 
participate and resolve conflicts first at the local level. This initial incli- 
nation to solve problems locally, combined with the availability of legit- 
imate village-wide political institutions, meant that Ghanaians tended to 
conceptualise the state-society relationship and shape the political arena 
primarily in terms of the local community rather than as ethnically based 
linkages to the national capital. 
This study attempts to move beyond an analysis of village political or- 
ganisation to reveal an important, yet understudied connection between 
grassroots political development and the mediation of potential ethnic 
conflict at the local and national levels. When Ivorian villagers rely on the 
personal power of local and urban-based economic elites to make de- 
cisions and organise politics, ethnically based social'exclusion in the pol- 
itical realm is reinforced. Many Ivorians report that there is no longer any 
reason to buy into local or national-level political institutions. This high 
level of frustration, with no viable outlet for direct political participation, 
provides an important context for understanding the December 1999 COUP 
d'itat and subsequent ethnic violence in C6te d'Ivoire. This perspective of 
grassroots political organisation and development reveals that the civil war 
did not emerge out of nowhere, and was not simply provoked by 
worsening economic times; rather, the conflict is grounded in a longer 
history of ethnically based political exclusion. Even during the earlier 
'good times' of the 'Ivorian miracle', when northerners and foreigners 
were welcomed to come and work on Ivorian cocoa and coffee plan- 
tations, and virgin land was in greater abundance, local cross-ethnic pol- 
itical participation and thus the possibility for conflict resolution was 
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severely limited. Recent economic hard times have merely helped to open 
the Pandora's Box, transforming politics into a zero-sum game between 
larger, ethno-regional factions. Unfortunately, the absence of experi- 
ence with local-level ethnic cooperation and this longer legacy of political 
exclusion will probably make the mediation of C6te d'Ivoire's civil 
war even more challenging and difficult. 
The outlook in Ghana, although far from perfect, is relatively more 
hopeful. Ghanaian villagers report that local avenues for political partici- 
pation and problem resolution do exist. While clientelist networks remain 
important, they often pass through local government channels, arguably 
reinforcing the strength of local politicians rather than bypassing or 
superseding them. It is likely that these more legitimately rooted local 
institutions help mediate the potential for ethnic conflict at the local level 
and then prevent ethnic divisions from destabilising the national political 
system. Still, the lack of effective linkages upward from the village to the 
national political system is a problem that must be resolved for genuine 
long-term political stability in Ghana. The potential for disarticulation 
between democracy at the grassroots and for the nation remains dis- 
quieting. 
N O T E S  
I. CBte d'Ivoire adopted a multiparty system under long-time President Houphouet-Boigny in lggo 
(Widner ~ggq), and Ghana moved to multipartyisn~ in 1992 (Herbst 1994). 
2. In Ghana, in March 2002, a long-standing chieftaincy dispute between two rival clans resulted in 
approximately 31 deaths and over 3,000 displaced people in Northern region. In October and 
November 2002, communal clashes between local ethnic resulted in g deaths and 336 displaced 
persons. Both of these conflicts originated over relatively minor disputes over property or accusations 
of petty theft. (www.irilmews.org). In none of the above cases does it appear that the conflict spread 
beyond the borders of those ethnic communities directly involved, nor was the source of the conflict a 
dispute over the legitimacy of the national government. 
3. For example, Woods (2003) correctly einphasises the role of increasing land pressure and labour 
costs in sharpening ethnic tensions in CBte d'Ivoire. Whiie a cross-national perspective on the Ivorian 
and Ghanaian governments' historically diierent immigrant labour policies would further support his 
argument, it remains necessary to see how these structural pressures may be channelled differently 
given the variations in local associations and political institutions. 
4. Some of the early work on civil society (Chazan 1992; Diamond 1988) was criticised for assuming 
that civil society organisations were participatory and democratic (Callaghy 1994; Kasfir 1998). 
Similarly, some of the social capital literature (Putnam 1993) has been criticised for not distinguishing 
between different types of social capital (Fine 2001). 
5. Again, Varshney's research design is exceptional in that he examines the role of civil society in 
cities with and without communal violence. 
6. Such rigorous empirical investigation not only disentangles the concept of civil society from 
delllocracy, but also problematises the development of social capital, addressing one of Levi's (1996) 
criticisms of the social capital literature. 
7. The fact that this study and VonDoepp's report such opposite findings for decentralised 
Protestant church groups reinforces the necessity of looking within organisations rather than making 
assumptions based on organisational forms. 
8. This dynamic and mutually constitutive process is similar to what Migdal (2001) describes as a 
'state in society' approach. 
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9. Fine (2001) and Evans (1996) make a similar point that the concept of social capital must include 
an analysis of differentials in power, which can lead to conflict, domination, and excl~~sion, ot 
necessarily 'positive' outcomes. 
10. Tarrow (1996) critiques Putnam's work for not examining an important prior causal factor, the 
effect of dierent  patterns of state building. 
1 1 .  Fieldwork was conductecl from April to August 1997 and from October 1998 to October rggg in 
two similar villages in Tano District in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana and in hvo similar villages in 
the Abengourou region of CBte d'Ivoire. Fictional names are used for these villages in the footnotes to 
protect the anonymity of the sources. These two regions were selected to highlight the cross-national 
comparison and not because they were nationally representative. Considerable regional variation 
exists in both CBte d'Ivoire and Ghana. The pattern of variation is also similar in both countries in 
terms of geography, modes of economic production, levels of infrastructure, and religious and ethnic 
composition of the population. In very general terms, the regions chosen were both in transitional 
forest zones with continued reliance on cocoa production, perhaps slightly better than average levels of 
wealth and infrastructure, and a more predominantly Akan, Christian population. It is notable that 
while both regions are considered 'southern', they are both located in the centre of each country and 
straddle the north and south in multiple ways. The author's limited field experience and knowledge of 
other regions in each of the country cases suggests that the broad similarities between different regions 
within each country might be more significant than the dierences. Stronger inferences about 
'national' dierences would require further fieldwork in additional regions and may be investigated 
in future research. 
12. The exception was the elderly advocacy group, which was aggressively expanding its mem- 
bership during the time of the fieldwork. Still, because the organisation was in its infancy, based in the 
regional capital an hour away, and there were Few activities that brought members together within the 
\;illage, the study retains its focus on the church groups. 
13. In contrast to Ghana, where the only youth groups were connected to religious organisations, in 
Cbte d'Ivoire there were many relatively small youth groups in each village. This is an interesting 
exception to the general rule that Ghanaian voluntary associations are more numerous but with 
smaller membership bases. 
14. Whiie there was an element of government supervision over the GVC most directly linked to 
government, this monitoring was sporadic and extremely distant (to even say it was 'arm's length' 
would imply a cosier proximity than existed). The village members were directly responsible for the 
'government' GVC's governance structure and accountability (or lack thereof ). 'Govern~nent' GVCs 
had been dissolved and then reformed on the initiative of village residents, not any government 
agency. Village leaders had also broken off and formed new GVCs on their own. 
15. For example, Morris MacLean (2002) describes in detail how experiences of colonial state 
formation influence the conceptualisation of the state-society relationship in the provision of social 
support, thereby shaping the development of colonial and post-colonial social policies. 
16. Collier & Levitsky (1997) illustrate the extent of conceptual stretching in this field with their work 
on 'democracy with adjectives'. 
17. While the divergent ways that Ivorians and Ghanaians experience the state at the local level is 
obviously important in shaping the above terminology and underlying conceptualisations, the differ- 
ences revealed earlier in the way that local associations are organised parallel and reinforce this 
variation in political value development. It is precisely this dynamic interaction between state, society 
and local associational life that is underst~~died, particularly in Africa, where state, society and civil 
society are often conceptualised in conflictual terms. 
18. Men's focus group (tape recording), Opanin, CBte d'lvoire, September 1999. 
19. Women's focus group (tape recording), Barima, Ghana, March 1999. 
20. M7hile citizenship is a concept that does not readily translate into the local Akan languages used 
in Ghana and CBte d'Ivoire, the idea of reciprocity is not culturally foreign. Thus, citizenship was 
understood easily as the reciprocal rights and duties of villagers us-a-uir the state. Efforts were made to 
emphasise that the question being asked was, 'What does the state owe you?', and not, 'What do you 
want from the state?' 
21. It is noteworthy that Ghanaian and Ivorian respondents almost never mentioned the rights and 
obligations 'classically' associated with citizenship in advanced industrialised democracies in the US 
and Western Europe. Thus, 2 % or fewer of respondents in each country mentioned the right to 
freedom, equality, political participation, or the protection of private property. Similarly, very few 
respondents cited duties to obey the laws of the state or senre the military. Even when Ghanaians 
mentioned paying taxes or Ivorians described their duty to participate in the political process, the 
response rate was well behind the most frequent replies. This insight demonstrates how different 
political histories, including different everyday experiences interacting with local associations and the 
state, shape how people develop their own conceptualisation of the state-society relationship (Gore 
1995; Tdly 1995). 
22. Su~vey i n t e ~ e w  by author, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire. 
23. Survey interview by author, Barima, Ghana. 
24. Survey interview by author, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire. 
25. These social services were formerly provided free (or at a highly subsidised cost) in both Ghana 
and CBte cl'Ivoire, but since the implementation of structural adjustment reforms, users must pay 
relatively high fees to obtain access (EVIorris MacLean 2002). 
2G. Survey inteniew by author, Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire. 
27. Sunley interview by author, Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire. 
28. Men's focus group (tape recording), Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire, September 1999. 
29. S~nvey interview by author, Makwan, Ghana. 
30. Despite contrary official rhetoric, the Ivorian decentralisation programme has been lunited. 
The much-touted programme of 'communalisation' was moving slowly and only applied to one of the 
two villages. 
31. While t l~e  local organisation of political parties might have been included in an earlier section 
where the character of local volunta~y associations was discussed, this paper examines them here to 
reflect the tighter integration of parties with the state in both CBte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Although both 
countries had officially been multiparty political systems since the early ~ggos, the ruling party from the 
single-party era had continued to dominate and had, to that date, never been defeated. 
32. In the past, sous-pr@ctu,r officials have experienced difficulty in designating even one official 
representative of each political party in order to monitor the elections at each polling station. 
33. For a useful analysis of the ethno-regional politics of the Ivorian party system, see Crook (1997). 
34. Frequently, village chiefs were relatively less active in CBte d'Ivoire than in Ghana, passing the 
majority of cases on to the justice system in the regional capital (30-60 minutes travel time away). 
Furthermore, there was no elected village body to regulate village problems in CBte d'Ivoire. Nor were 
any villagers elected to represent the village at the mayor's office or the sous-prqecture, both considered 
'distant' in more than just geographical terms. 
35. Voter participation is an inadequate indicator of local democratic participation and practice for 
several reasons. First, since elections in many countries occur only once evely four to five years, voter 
participation measures sporadic political activity and does not reflect democratic practice on an 
eve~yday basis. Second, particularly in developing countries, elections constitute a highly formal pol- 
itical institution and do not reflect informal political values and practices. Third, comparable local- 
level data is not always available, particularly in developing countries. For this study, village-level data 
was only available in Ghana; in CBte d'Ivoire, the data was not collected at the village level, and 
regional statistics were only released by national officials. Whiie d i c u l t  to compare accurately, voter 
participation may be slightly higher in Ghana than in CBte d'Ivoire but the difference is relatively 
marginal. 
36. Women's focus group (tape recording), Opanin, CBte d'Ivoire, September 1999. 
37. Sulvey interview, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire. 
38. Survey interview, Opanin, CBte dlIvoire. 
39. Inte~view by author, Kyere, CBte d'Ivoire, 13.7.1999. 
40. Peter Evans (1996) discusses the limits of locally generated social capital when there is an 
absence of effective linkages to the national level. 
41. Women's focus group (tape recording), Barima, Ghana, March 1999. 
42. Apparently, the sunk costs and barriers to ently are lower in comparison to having a case heard 
at the ch~efs  court. 
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